Abstract -Nowadays Internet has become a critical part of our daily lives and an affordable Internet access is a leading engine of economic, cultural, social and political growth. In our opinion, cooperation among customers could give a boost to Internet availability and affordability, therefore, we propose an attractive and efficient pricing mechanism to give incentives to wireless users who decide to share their connection resources with others. Thanks to the proposed system, a natural expansion of the wireless coverage area can be realized increasing accessibility and reducing connection fees. The system presented in this work is intended to be economical effective, easy to implement and compatible with today's wireless technologies. It takes into account a specific user utility function in order to provide an elevated customers satisfaction degree and it has the aim of reaching the overall network efficiency using pricing as a way, not only to share transmission resources, but to control and prevent the network congestion as well.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet access is no longer a luxury; it is a lifeline to contemporary society and it is becoming a basic right to obtain a fully social, intellectual and economic development; however, availability and affordability of Internet access services remain the two main obstacles to overcome for guaranteeing this basic right to everyone. In the last few years, we have been witnesses of the increasing interest in wireless network architectures and technologies such as the use of wireless network devices within homes, offices, hotels and public areas. Thanks to these new technologies it is possible to provide a large coverage of wide areas using many access points or, in the next future, it could be possible to deploy a fully pervasive and infrastructure free coverage if standard end-user terminals (i.e. laptop, netbook, tablet PC) will decide to work together in a collaborative fashion [1] . According to this new communication scenario, the following question deserves to receive an appropriate answer: why the wireless nodes and the private access points should participate in a collaborative manner to increase the coverage area and to provide connectivity toward Internet?
In a wireless network the connectivity is provided by nodes that forward packets but the forwarding functionality turns in an expensive cost in terms of bandwidth reduction, energy consumption and security risks; thus, considering the natural selfish behaviour of the end-users, they would never be interested in cooperation without a convenient economic incentive. From this particular prospective, an attractive and accurate pricing strategy can be the driving mechanism toward the natural and dynamic development of public wireless networks based on mobile and fixed cooperative nodes. According to these remarks, we propose a pricing strategy coupled to a wireless system architecture that can be used to stimulate the useful and economical attractive cooperation between wireless nodes. Since, the access to the Internet is the main goal of each wireless node, this access can be considered as the main service required by wireless end-users, and the access points within the wireless architecture represent the first providers of that service. Every wireless node could buy a connection service from a node already connected to the network so obtaining the access to the Internet; moreover, each node could sell to another node the purchased service in order to pay off own connection costs. In this way, the nodes taking part to the service provision can also make profits in order to balance the forwarding packets costs. Most of the time, depending by the amount of active connections, the reseller nodes could obtain a profit greater than the forwarding costs making the business model very attractive and profitable for both end-users and resellers.
Starting from these interesting considerations, the pricing strategy and the related economical model proposed in this work, are designed and well suited for a highly changeable heterogeneous wireless environment; furthermore, the proposed economical scheme has a quite general soundness because it is not related to any specific communication standard or network technology; on the contrary, it can be applied to any wireless network system architecture taking into account the interoperability with different communication standards and network technologies (i.e. Wi-Fi, Wi-Max, LTE…) [2] [3] .
In summary we present the following contributions: 1. We devise the communication system specifying all the signalling messages between the different entities involved in the communication and resources sharing process paying particular attention to the specific role played by each device within the proposed wireless network architecture. 2. We design a flexible and attractive pricing mechanism in order to provide incentives for private wireless nodes to collaborate each other; this strategy supports differentiation among users according to their own connectivity requests in terms of bandwidth and time duration with the aim of making the service more convenient through the possibility of offering discounts. 3. We evaluate, throughout a simulation framework, the advantages of the proposed system in terms of customers satisfaction and overall network efficiency using pricing as a way, not only to share transmission resources, but to control and prevent the network congestion as well. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present a review of the related works in the context of pricing mechanisms for wireless networks highlighting their shortcomings respect to the proposed system. In section III we introduce the general architecture used for our proposal whilst in section IV we describe the pricing scheme, the actors involved in the resource sharing process and communication path, the strategies and the behaviours of each entity within the network. Extensive performances evaluation analysis through a new self developed simulator are presented in Sections V. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VI describing future interesting research directions.
II. RELATED WORKS AND LIMITATIONS
Economic models and strategies based on the notions of utility functions and congestion pricing, have been successfully applied to fixed wired networks [4] [5] [6] . Such models can guide the development of flexible and robust procedures for efficient utilization of network resources based on user requirements and preferences but they cannot be easily extended to the wireless networks because they do not address the unique and specific characteristics of the wireless channel (i.e. bandwidth reduction due to channel interference and imperfection); in particular, the pricing schemes in [7] [8] assume that the network is interference-free. In the last years, many different pricing strategies and economical model for wireless networks have been designed [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] but they suffer of few limitations and they are not suited for the proposed communication system as explained later on.
In particular, Sallent et al. [9] proposed an architecture containing both radio resource management and spectrum auction mechanisms in order to enable the interaction of users and operators through an appropriate pricing strategy while increasing the efficient use of radio resources. Nevertheless, schemes based on auctions [9] need the presence of a third entity in order to make easy the communication between the generic user and the service provider; on the contrary, our scheme is designed to be more simple and effective without the presence of other parties; furthermore, using the sealed-bid auction mechanism, users are forced to make a comparison on a specific resource in a competitive way. This extremely competitive behaviour is only to service provider's advantage thus, in our proposal, we would remove this limitation by making each user able to formulate its own service connection request.
The scheme based on optimization strategies [10] is mainly focused on the exact knowledge of users numerousness and their connection requests to apply mathematical criterions for the profit maximization; on the contrary, our approach is more general and it is not strictly related neither to users incoming rate nor to any specific users connection requests. In the same way, schemes based on the demand/supply [11] [12] paradigm result not very realistic because it is quite difficult to know the exact demand function.
Finally, the game theory paradigm offers several models [13] [14] that cannot be applied to the proposed system scenario as well because the rationality concept, on which they are based on, does not take into account the will of each user to buy or refuse a specific service. In addition, those works do not provide any differentiation in terms of user categories or service classes [15] [16] and they do not take into account basic and realistic effects due to the system congestion because they always consider an unlimited bandwidth network scenario.
Starting from these motivations, the proposed work has the aim of overcoming the limitations of previous schemes by designing a new pricing mechanism that considers different real aspects of a wireless multi-hop network set up by the collaboration of private nodes. In the proposed scheme, the price to pay for obtaining the connection is evaluated in a deterministic way and it is based on several factors such as the requested transmission rate, the connection duration, the link quality through the multi-hop path and the congestion level in terms of available bandwidth over the wireless links. Finally, the pricing scheme allows to model the available assets of each user by promoting discounts from the III. GENERAL SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE service provider to increase the demand also making the overall system architecture, more attractive to users and easy to be implemented.
The simple and extensible communication architecture proposed in this work is mainly focused on wireless heterogeneous networks in which only one access point (AP), equipped with two communication interfaces, is implemented. The wired interface provides the connectivity to the Internet whilst the wireless one provides connectivity to both end-user and reseller wireless nodes. Figure 1 displays two different wireless network topologies: in the scenario A every node is directly connected to the AP through a wireless link whilst scenario B supports multi-hop connections in which some end-user nodes need more than one "intermediate forwarding node" to reach the AP in order to obtain Internet access. According to the depicted scenarios we have the following three main actors within the wireless network architecture: AP (Access Point), Reseller (Intermediate node) and Client (End-user). These entities have different characteristics, tasks and behaviours that will be deeply analysed in section IV.
Even if the proposed system architecture is designed to be very general and well suited for wireless communications, few explicit technological aspects and constraints need to be specified in order to make the model more realistic.
In particular, the AP buys the connectivity directly from one or more Internet Service Providers (ISPs) throughout a dedicated link on licensed frequency bands using a specific transmission technology (i.e., Wi-MAX, LTE, UMTS); then, it sells connectivity to different Resellers or Clients on unlicensed frequency bands by using short range and free access transmission technology such as Wi-Fi. For this reason, the generic Reseller node can provide a natural extension of the wireless coverage area but it needs to be equipped with a higher processing complexity respect to the generic client node in order to handle packet relay procedure. On the other hand, we would like to remark that not all 3G and 4G users make a continuous use of connectivity and have the convenience to sign (flat) contracts with network operators. Users with sporadic connectivity needs, are often obliged to face an expensive volume rates. Our strategy would give to those users the chance to be operator free and, possibly, get the same services at much lower costs. Thus, we considered that the generic client want to be free from traditional ties with this or that Internet Service Provider (ISP) obtaining an "on-demand" service connection only when needed and at a reasonable cost. We were inspired by the FON system [26] during the designing phase of our work but respect to our architecture, the FON system does not provide any service class differentiation or QoS for end users; in addition, the FON system requires its clients to be part of a community with specific rules and constraints whilst our proposal is designed to be completely transparent to network operators and independent from ISPs.
Our system aims to demonstrate that, under specific traffic conditions, the AP can pay off its costs also obtaining a reasonable revenue; this increase in revenue can motivate the AP to ask for an increase in service to its ISP who finally can benefit from the proposed system architecture.
The presented communication scenario does not support users mobility in this first proposal, thus all the nodes participating to the wireless networks are placed in a fixed position and they interfere with others according to the models shown in the next section. This choice is mainly motivated by the firm conviction that, in a realistic communication scenario, reseller nodes will be mostly private home users with high processing capability whilst end-users will be, at the most, nomadic (reduced processing capability) within a large area and they will look for Internet connection according to their needs [25] .
A. Wireless Channel Characteristics: Interference Model
In a generic wireless network composed of n wireless nodes, the interference between the nodes is strictly linked to the achievable transmission rate and to the rate adaptation mechanism, consequently. Using the physical interference model [17] , successful reception of a packet sent by node x to node y depends on the signal to noise plus interference ratio (SINR) (1)
where P x (t) is the transmission power of the sender at time t, P z (t) is the transmission power of the interfering node z at time t, d xy (t) is the distance between the sender x and the receiver y at time t, f xy (t) is the small-scale fading parameter from the interference node z to the receiver y at time t, y(t) is the set of nodes interfering the receiver y at time t, Ω y (t) is the power of the background noise usually equal to -100dBm, G t and G r are the transmit and receive antenna gains, is the path-loss exponent, d 0 This model can be specified for a generic topology shown in figure 2, considering that resellers nodes' identifiers are sorted in ascending order from i−1 to i+1.
Consequently, the reduction factor of link capacity ρ is the reference distance and L is the system loss factor. 
Where χ is the number of possible range values assumed by the SINR, β is the SINR threshold between two consequent SINR intervals. Hence, the following mathematical model is designed taking into account the signal to noise ratio level, in order to determine whether the desired data transmission is allowed or not, and which data transmission rate can be achieved. This analysis shows the existence of physical and technological limitations causing the reduction of the achievable transmission rate over a generic wireless link. These limitations are also due to wireless link capacity and to the specific transmission coding and modulation techniques related to specific technological aspects. With the aim of keeping the proposed approach very general and not strictly related to any specific technology architecture, we consider all the interference effects as a simple reduction of the available bandwidth over the wireless link that each wireless node can evaluate in terms of SINR.
IV. PRICING SCHEME: ACTORS, STRATEGIES, PAYOFF The actors involved in the designed pricing scheme are the following:
• Access Point (AP): root node, it buys the connectivity directly from an internet service provider (ISP) using a dedicated connection.
• Reseller (R): intermediate node, it buys the connection service "on demand" from an AP and it sells the connection to another reseller or to an end-user.
• Client (C): end-user node, it buys a connection service from the AP or from a reseller for own use only. When a new node joins the wireless network has to declare its own identity and category (i.e. AP, R, C), the mandatory differentiation between clients and resellers is due to the different strategies adopted by each actor. Each client takes its own choices according to its utility function; on the contrary, the reseller buys a service for its personal use and for reselling it. All the nodes within the networks have a limited bandwidth capacity and they can refuse to provide a specific service if they cannot support a specific request in terms of required quality of service.
Clients are divided into the following service classes according to the required transmission rate and the expected quality of service:
• Business Class -B • Medium Class -M • Economy Class -E Business clients are the most demanding, they require a constant and elevated transmission rate that has to be guaranteed for the whole transmission time. Furthermore, they have a price inelasticity of demand and they are well arranged to pay more than other users. On the contrary, Economy clients ask for a lower transmission rate; they can tolerate bandwidth variation and high transmission delay and they are mainly interested in saving money, for this reason they have a high price elasticity of demand. Finally, Medium clients present requirements in the middle between Business and Economy classes in terms of transmission rate and available assets.
A. Client Strategy
In the proposed architecture, the client behaviour is differentiated according to the specific service class; each client asks for a connection service to a reseller or directly to the AP taking into account its own needs in terms of bandwidth and time duration. In particular, medium and economy clients will formulate their connection requests asking for a specific data volume V to be exchanged in a fixed time T also declaring the measured SINR value γ over the wireless link used later by the AP to calculate the service price. On the other side, business clients will formulate a connection request asking for a specific peak transmission rate B peak
In the following we show the service connection request format for all the service classes: during a fixed time T.
Economy class and Medium class
After the forwarding request connection phase, the generic client will wait for a service reply from the network, if it receives a service deny message it will look for another service provider, if there is any, otherwise it will evaluate the received positive connection reply by considering the proposed service price and its own utility function.
Each client has to verify that the obtained service price is compatible with its own means and with the willingness to pay for a specific service. We designed a simple utility function in order to take into account two different aspects that determine the user satisfaction: the economic and the qualitative (QoS). According to this vision, even if the generic user had the means to pay a certain price, its utility function will also be weighted based on the quality of service provided by the network. The chosen utility function of the generic user i belonging to one of the three different service classes is the following:
where Pav is the price that the client is willingness to pay, Pnet is the price offered by the network for a specific service, Bach is the mean achievable transmission rate and Breq=V / T is the transmission rate required by the client. Moreover we imposed that the ratio between Bach and Breq has to be always greater than or equal to a fixed threshold value in order to guarantee a minimum quality of service to the client. With the aim of making a QoS differentiation between clients belonging to different service classes, the fixed threshold value is chosen different for each service class. In particular, for business clients the threshold value is fixed equal to 1 because the requested bandwidth has to be always guaranteed. Since Pav represents the willingness to pay of the generic client, it is defined as a random variable uniformly distributed in a range [a,b] ; each client knows its own value Pav while the other wireless nodes only know the probability density function (PDF) of the variable Pav. Clearly, the range [a,b] is different for the three classes of clients according to the different requested services and the different available assets as shown in the expression (7) where the terms E, M and B refer to economy, medium and business classes respectively: 
Each generic reseller
has a limited bandwidth capacity to be handled and shared among the different requests coming from nodes in the neighbourhood; moreover, since it has an own limited sojourn time, it has to evaluate its own availability to provide the requested service in terms of bandwidth and time before to forward the connection request to the next reseller or directly to the AP. The standard connection request forwarded by the reseller has the following format:
where γ i-1 is the SIRN over the wireless link between the applicant and R i whilst γ i is the SINR over the wireless link between R i and the next reseller or AP in the path through the Internet access. The service request is forwarded in a broadcast way to all the wireless nodes within the coverage range of R i ; since R i has only a local wireless channel awareness, it simply forwards the received requests in order to discover different paths having different SINR values over each link towards the AP as shown in figure 4. Once the connection request is received by the AP, the price is evaluated taking into account the real transmission channel conditions over the different discovered paths with the aim of offering several choices to the client. Actually, it is sufficient to forward only the minimum value between γ i-1 and γ i ) , T , V ( ASK min γ in order to provide the AP with the information about the maximum capacity reduction related to the worst SINR channel link value in the communication path evaluated throughout the equation (4) . .
The main task of each reseller is to give a good offer to the clients in order to satisfy their utility function; for this reason, each reseller forwards to the client or to the next reseller in the communication path, the less expensive offer. On the other side, the reseller has to increase the price in order to pay off the forwarding costs getting its own profit. Each reseller R i applies a pricing strategy consisting in a simple additive increase that is a constant The proposed pricing mechanism takes into account several key factors:
; then, it verifies if the connection request can be satisfied in agreement with the requested parameters V and T otherwise, it proposes an alternative to the client by extending the service time to the value T*. The AP calculates the price for the connection request as explained in the following.
• Client request: depending on the quality over the wireless link and the specific service classes, different charges can be applied.
• AP congestion control: a congested wireless node (i.e. Reseller or AP) increases the price for a connection service in order to discourage the buyers; this behaviour turns in a natural congestion control and reduction.
• Sales promotion and discounts: special prices can be applied for long connections in order to make the service more convenient and attractive for the clients. The following relation resumes all the previous aspects in the calculation of the price P for a generic connection service i.
where:
• pu i
• T is the service duration computed by the AP and extended, if necessary, according to the achievable bandwidth and the quality of the wireless link;
= s⋅b is the unitary price of each connection where s and b are two coefficients used for weighting the service class and the achievable transmission rate; the meaning and the usefulness of these parameters will be deeply investigated in the simulation section of the paper;
• d t is the discount rate based on the connection duration time; it is in a range between 0 and a maximum threshold value Th d
• c is a coefficient that implements a congestion control mechanism based on the exponential increase of the price during high congestion periods. In other words, the term c represents the normalized network resources utilization and it is equal to 0 when the network is completely empty whilst it can reach the value 1 if the network is extremely congested. In particular, the discount rate d t
The strategy beyond the discount mechanism in based on a simple and effective idea consisting in a greater discount over a longer connection time. Moreover, the discount rate is lower when few clients are connected to the system and it increases with a higher number of active connections in order to make the service more attractive and convenient for new clients. This approach could lead to a congestion situation because many clients could be attracted by the sales promotion, hence, we compensated this behaviour introducing the c coefficient in the formula (9) in order to consider the real congestion level in terms of active connections respect to the maximum number of connections that can be handled by the AP. The discount function that synthesizes these behaviours is the following:
is strictly related to the requested time service T and to the number of active connections.
where λ is the calls incoming rate, T is the service connection duration requested by the client, T 0
In summary, thanks to the mechanism of sales promotions, the AP can modulate the service demand, it can discriminate the clients according to different service classes, it can provide incentives for a specific service category and it can increase the amount of traffic in specific periods (i.e. applying discounts in specific day hours or during holidays).
is the time connection value beyond that the AP starts to apply the discount policy and α is a scale factor.
Once the price P for a specific connection service request has been computed, the AP sends a reply message to the client through one or more resellers; beside the price, this explicit message contains the data volume V to be exchanged and the duration connection time T* ≥ T; we would like to remark that T* could be different respect to the value T requested by the client according to the remarks on the achievable bandwidth already done in this section.
D. Payoff
This subsection provides a payoff description for each entity involved in the proposed communication network architecture.
Starting from the classical game theory approach, we consider the payoffs as the economical profits obtained by each entity within the network following a specific behaviour; payoffs are different for each actor and each of them, within the proposed system, chooses the best strategy to reach own settled payoff.
The payoff of the generic client is represented by its own utility function; the larger is the utility function value U i payoff_C , the bigger is the client satisfaction. i = U i Concerning the payoffs of AP and resellers, it is necessary to define the activity period during which the specific actor provides the service. The payoff for the reseller R 
where N is the total number of connections handled during the reseller activity period, π j is the profit obtained from the sale of the connection j and c i takes into account the general costs of the reseller R i
In particular, as already specified in section 3, reseller nodes are mostly private home users who have their own device (supporting high processing capability) always connected to the electricity network; thus it is plausible that costs coming from energy consumption, connection and traffic handling can be considered as a constant that, in a first approximation, could be neglected respect to other costs. This assumption is even more true if you consider that the majority of users leave their home network devices on, even when they do not generate data traffic. coming from energy consumption, connection and traffic handling.
In the same way, the payoff for the AP is computed as the difference between profits obtained from the sale of connection services to the resellers or to the clients and 
Our approach is not for the specific benefit of any of the involved entities: AP, Resellers and Clients; of course, Resellers taking part to the service provision can surely make profits but this is not their main goal. In our idea, Resellers are not interested in a purely lucrative business; on the contrary, their main objective is the reduction of their own connection costs. In other words, the overall system is designed to provide large scale services at an affordable cost to all. We hope that in the near future, the right to information for all individuals will be considered in the same way as the right to education and therefore may make sense the design of systems that aim for a more equitable distribution of costs rather than to achieve high profits. Figure 5 summarizes the messages exchanged between the three actors (i.e. Clients, Resellers and AP) involved in the communication network during the service connection starting phase.
V. SIMULATION FRAMEWORK AND MEANINGFUL
RESULTS In this section we present the simulation framework to validate our system and the extensive simulation results obtained through a new self developed simulator based on the Agent-Based Modeling and Simulation (ABMS) [18] [19] approach as detailed in the following. We decided to use this novel agent-based simulation approach rather than the well-known network simulators such (e.g., Ns2, GloMoSim, OMNeT) because we are mainly interested to test the systems behaviour from an economic point of view by keeping the proposed approach very general and not strictly related to any specific communication technology standard or architecture.
We would like to remark that a first embryonic study of prices and profits trend for the whole system architecture has been presented in our previous work [20] testing a simplified communication scenario with the aim of measuring the goodness of the proposed pricing strategy in terms of profits and overall network utility. Now we have radically expanded the simulation framework making it more realistic by using client profiles differentiation and several levels of reselling to implement and support the multi-hop transmission. This section first explains the potential of the ABMS paradigm; then it presents the simulation assumptions required for testing the proposed system and the meaningful obtained results. 
A. Agent Based Modeling and Simulation -ABMS
Agent-based modeling and simulation (ABMS) [18] [19] is a new approach to modeling systems comprised of interacting autonomous agents. An ABMS is a computational model for simulating the actions and interactions of autonomous individuals It combines elements of game theory, complex systems, emergence, computational sociology, multi-agent systems and evolutionary programming. Individual agents are typically characterized by specific following properties such as: Autonomy, Social ability, Reactivity and Proactiveness [21] .
According to these properties the ABMS provides a natural method for studying a complex system as the one proposed in our work in which the actors (i.e. AP, Resellers, Clients) can be easily modelled as agents.
Thanks to substantial public research and development investments, many ABMS software environments are now freely available. Repast (REcursive Porous Agent Simulation Toolkit) [22] is the leading free and open source large-scale agent-based modelling and simulation library based on Java. All the described features led us to choose the version of Repast Simphony 1.2.0 [22] for modelling our system architecture and the interactions between different actors within the network. Figure 6 shows a screenshot of the implemented simulator running through a simple and friendly graphic user interface; to the best of our knowledge, this is the first simulator based on Repast for modelling a telecommunication system architecture.
B. Simulation Approach and Assumptions
In this section we explain all the assumptions concerning the simulator implementation for testing the proposed system architecture and pricing strategy.
• The "batch means method" [23] is used for interval estimation in a steady-state simulation. This method is based on one long run (versus numerous shorter ones) in which data needs to be deleted only once. The raw output data are placed in a few large batches, and the analyst works with these few batch means as if they were independent. For our simulations, we chose one long run of 10 hours and 10 batches according with Law [24] that demonstrated how, for a fixed total sample size, it was best to use a very small number of batches of the longest possible length in order to strongly reduce the autocorrelation of the observed process. In our simulations, the confidence interval level is fixed at 0.95 and the first batch is excluded by the statistical error computation in order to reduce the effects of the system transitory.
• With the aim of making a better comparison between the obtained results, we chose to keep on the AP and the Resellers during the whole simulation time whilst the clients can switch between active and off states; for this reason we populated the simulation grid with a fixed number N of client nodes modelled as classical ON-OFF sources with exponentially distributed inter-arrivals and service times. The activity factor (AF) of each client is strictly related to the activity and silent times according to the following relation:
• Furthermore, in order to make a valuable differentiation between client profiles, we introduced the following relations between economy, medium and business users in terms of transmission rates ratio: • According to the previous relations, we defined a relative service class price (RSCP) index in order to weight each specific class respect to the basic economy one. This index will be used by the AP for evaluating the unitary price of each connection; it represents the service class parameter s in the equation (9) (9) used by the AP for computing the price for each service request. A detailed example is provided in appendix A.
• We revised the definition of utility function we gave in section IV.A in order to make it well suited for realistic traffic scenarios; in particular we added two new constraints with the aim of taking into account the circumstance in which the price computed by the network is greater than the willingness to pay of the client. We differentiated this case in two sub-cases; if the price computed by the AP is included in a range between the maximum value of the user's Pav and two times the willingness to pay, we slightly modified the proposed formula reversing the ratio between Bach and Breq in order to correctly weight the negative utility; on the other side, if the price obtained by the AP is greater than two times the user's willingness to pay, we evaluated the client dissatisfaction considering a negative utility function value precisely equal to the price that the generic client is willingness to pay. This approximation is mainly motivated by a real human behaviour consisting in having the same disappointing reaction if the proposed price for the connection is greater than two times the economic budget. • Since user utility is an increasing monotone function depending by the simulation time and the amount of connections, we defined a Normalized Network Utility index (NNU) with the aim of considering the mean satisfaction level of users asking for a service connection and receiving a specific price.
i U NNU
We would like to remark that the previous index takes into account also the connection service refusals due to high prices offered by the AP whilst it does not consider the connection refusals due to the lack of bandwidth or quality of service fulfilment; those connections will be taken into account through the classical system block probability and quality of service indexes because the dissatisfaction of those clients does not have any economic reason.
• Each reseller in the simulation framework has also the role of a business client with its own activity factor; this choice is mainly motivated by the fact that a reseller can be interested in buying and selling bandwidth resources in order to pay off own costs due to both data forwarding and personal connection purchase; since the proposed assumption is quite realistic it deserves to be introduced in the simulation environment.
C. Simulation Parameters and Traffic Scenarios
In this subsection we describe the simulated scenarios, the network topologies used for testing the proposed system architecture and the related pricing model.
According to the embryonic study conducted in [20] , we chose two different traffic scenarios: the homogeneous one in which only economy clients are involved and the heterogeneous one in which all the service classes are supported; furthermore we progressively extended the area covered by the multi-hop network in order to verify the goodness of the proposed approach in terms of profit obtained by AP and Resellers nodes involved in the cooperative connection resources exchange. For this reason, we started with a small network consisting of many different clients directly connected to an AP and we extended our study to a wider multi-hop network with 12 Resellers organized in three hierarchical levels. For the single-hop network topology we used a square grid area of 20×20 cells where each cell represents a quite realistic area of 100m 2   TABLE I  SYSTEM PARAMETERS ; then we progressively extended the network area up to 80×80 cells. Table I summarizes the system parameters used in the simulation campaigns and table II specifies the simulated traffic scenarios in terms of service classes. Table III shows all the simulated network topologies whilst a visual representation of the 2-hops topology has given in figure 7. For sake of clarity we would like to highlight that we preferred to show the simulation results varying the amount of users within the communication network in order to test the system architecture in different traffic load conditions; however, each traffic load condition in terms of connected clients, corresponds to a specific incoming calls rate λ [calls/minutes].
Parameter
This relation can be easily understood taking into account the amount N of clients in the simulation grid area, their activity factor AF and the average connection duration T as shown in the following formula:
According to these considerations, the discount function proposed in the equation (10) is still related to the requested service time T and to the amount of active connections.
D. Results
In this subsection we present the obtained results according to the following performance indexes: overall system utilization, accepted and refused connections, normalized network utility experienced by different clients, AP revenues and Resellers profits.
1) Homogeneous scenario
We conducted a detailed simulation analysis starting from a homogeneous traffic scenario in which the network has been loaded, from time to time, with clients belonging to the same traffic service class. This choice has been motivated by the need to study performance indexes and to correctly dimension the overall system architecture in terms of clients numerousness and total network utilization.
Thanks to this first analysis we understood the goodness and the potentialities of the proposed pricing strategy; thus we extended the analysis to a heterogeneous and more realistic traffic scenario in which all the different service classes are involved making the overall performance analysis more effective and meaningful.
According to these remarks and with the aim of providing a significant and concise description of the large amount of obtained results, we decide to show only the system behaviour due to the heterogeneous traffic scenario that offers the possibility of giving a more general and realistic soundness to the entire conducted work.
2) Heterogeneous scenario
Traffic composition for the heterogeneous scenario has been chosen with the aim of analyzing a future realistic situation in which it is reasonable to have a large percentage of economy users (i.e. 50%) and a small amount of business users (at the most 20%) as shown in table III. Figure 7 shows that, increasing the number of hops between a generic client and the AP, the overall system architecture is less congested in terms of resources utilization. This is mostly due to an increase of service connections refusal because of the bigger price computed by both AP and Resellers over a longer connection path. This system behaviour is perfectly in agreement with the results presented in the next pictures. The percentage of accepted connections respect to the ones asking for service connection is shown in figure 8 ; as we can see, the system accepts a lower amount of connections when both, the network dimension and the network load, increase in terms of clients. This is mostly due to a greater number of refusals because of the higher price along the multi-hop path.
The connections rejected can be differentiated in the following three categories:
• Connections refused because of the lack of network resources in terms of bandwidth. • Connections refused because the network cannot guarantee the required quality of service to satisfy the QoS constraints explained in section IV.
• Connection refused because of the client unavailability to pay the proposed price for the service. Next pictures better clarify those different reasons of refusal within the simulated traffic scenario. The percentage of refused connections due to the lack of bandwidth takes into account also the amount of connections refused because of a very low SINR value over the multi-hop path; for this reason the refusals amount increases according to the network dimension as confirmed by the trend of the lines in figure 9 .
The amount of refused connections due to the QoS constraint ( fig. 10 ) decreases augmenting the number of clients within the system because; in high load traffic conditions, a larger number of connections may be able to satisfy their QoS constraints. On the other side, the percentage of connections refusal increases with the network dimension because the probability of having a bigger bandwidth reduction factor become higher and quite realistic over longer communication paths making the satisfaction of the QoS constraint more challenging. The amount of refused connections due to the lack of economic resources ( fig. 11 ) is strictly related to the system congestion in terms of active clients; moreover, it is possible to note that, extending the network coverage area, the number of refused connections decreases because the system is slightly less congested as shown in figure 7 . Since the network congestion is weighed in the price equation (9) as an exponential factor, the price computed by the AP will be lower in a less congested network making the service acceptance within the reach of more clients, especially the Economy ones. When the number of clients within the system increases, the normalized network utility index (NNU) decreases consequently (fig. 12) ; this behaviour is mostly due to the pricing mechanism that implements also a congestion control technique by offering a bigger price to the connections when system resources are few.
This increase in price turns into a higher natural clients dissatisfaction in high load traffic conditions. However, it is possible to note that the NNU index is slightly affected by the distance in terms of hops from the clients to the AP making the average clients satisfaction almost independent by the network dimension.
We would like to note that, in this heterogeneous traffic scenario, the NNU is always positive even in high traffic load conditions. For these reasons we provide few figures in which the most significant performance indexes (i.e. NNU, Resellers' Profit) are plotted together varying the network load in terms of active clients and average distance from the AP. According to the considerations already done in this section, the NNU decreases while the network load increases and the avarage profit obtained by the Resellers has a complementary trend; thus, it is possible to note how the cross point of the two curves in figure 13 represents a desiderable working point for the system. This point guarantees a convenient non negative value for the network utility and a positive profit for the involved Resellers. We would like to remarks how a negative value for the resellers' profit could be considered as an encouraging result because the resellers' profit is computed as the difference between the expenses for buying the transmission resources and the revenues obtained by their selling; so for example, a negative value for resellers' profit equal to -20% means an expense amortization equivalent to the 80%. Considering that, each Reseller has also the operation of a Business client as explained V.B, it can take a great advantage in buying and reselling bandwidth in order to make an expense amortization.
The cross point of the two curves represents a specific system load and it could be also used by the network for supporting an effective connection admission control strategy aiming at a fair satisfaction of all the entities taking part in this collaborative system architecture.
Figures 14 extends the soundness of the proposed approach to a bigger network in which two layers of reselling can be used in order to offer a multi-hop access to Internet.
Extending the network coverage area, all the previous considerations are still valid; in particular, Resellers belonging to the closer layer start to have a positive profit in lower traffic load conditions whilst the ones belonging to the last layer need a higher traffic load to obtain a positive profit even if they can always pay off their expenses reducing their costs at least of 50% in low traffic load condition. In addition, moving from the first to the third level of reselling it is possible to observe how the system behaviour continues to be consistent because the resellers closer to the AP have to face larger costs due to a greater number of users getting the service connection; nevertheless, they can also have larger revenues respect to those belonging to a further level as shown in figure 15 .
This result encourages the Resellers to take part in the network resource sharing and it validates the overall designed system architecture. Figure 16 shows the revenue obtained by the AP; obviously the revenue grows according to the network load because a greater number of clients ask for the service connection but it seems to fall when the network coverage area increases. This behaviour could be very strange and unaccountable so we conducted a deeper investigation and we discovered that we have to look the problem from a different point of view in order to discover the truth. Actually, previous analyses do not take into account user's density within the system. We simulated the same number of clients varying network dimension and density consequently; for this reason, we need to compare system performances fixing the same clients density as shown in figure 17. Looking at that figure it is extremely clear how, fixing the density of clients, the revenue obtained by the AP increases with network dimension by making the coverage area extension very profitable for the AP. Evidently, the computed revenue do not take into account the fixed costs met by the AP because they represent only a constant scaling factor that is not meaningful for our analysis. In conclusion, figure 18 displays in a more perceptive way, the gain in terms of revenue achievable by a generic AP able to extend its own coverage area from 2-hops to 4-hops thanks to the co-operation of three levels of reselling. We can observe that, keeping the same clients density within the network, it is possible to double the revenue for the AP facing the same costs. Starting from this result, it could be possible to design a royalties based mechanism in order to guarantee the payment of a specific fee to the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) by those APs who have reached certain target profit; this profitable mechanism can encourage the ISPs to allow the reselling of bandwidth and transmission resources in the next future wireless Internet.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we presented a new pricing mechanism well suited for heterogeneous wireless multi-hop environments with the aim of attracting more clients to collaborate and share their resources to offer a connectivity service towards Internet at a convenient price. The proposed system architecture is quite easy, flexible and scalable because it is based on a set of parameters that can be tuned according to the needs of the different wireless nodes.
The goodness of the implemented pricing strategy has been validated through extensive simulations in terms of profits obtained by the nodes who decided to share their resources and overall network utility due to a fine clients satisfaction degree.
Future studies will be focused on new interesting behaviours such as competition between clients or resellers and new reselling ways of acting, mostly oriented to have a "social community" behaving once reached the target payoffs; moreover, new security aspects, billing models and attractive incentive mechanisms related to the proposed future wireless cooperative service, deserve to be investigated in order to make the overall system more feasible and attractive for ISPs.
APPENDIX A In this section we provide a numerical example to estimate a qualitative range of reasonable values for the P av
Starting from equation (9), we evaluate minimum and maximum values of all parameters used by the AP for a specific price computation. Considering for example an Economy profile, the following values are involved in the P parameter representing the willingness to pay of each users belonging to a specific service class (i.e. Economy, Medium, Business). We would like to remark that the estimated P av
